Abstract. Most of the aggregate signature schemes are based on identity public cryptosystem that these identity-based aggregate signatures have certificate management and key escrow problems. And most of these schemes use the bilinear pairings and efficiency is not high. A novel aggregate signature scheme (CLAS-BP) is proposed based on the certificateless public key cryptography theory. This scheme solves the key escrow problem of the identity-based public key cryptography and not uses the bilinear pairings. The analysis shows that this scheme provides a high security and efficient.
Introduction
Aggregate signature can aggregate signatures of n signers to n different message into a signature that make n signature verification into one signature verification. The aggregate signature is proposed to provide for several signatures of several users to verify and it is convenience that only needs once verification for several users. The message being signed is only known by the signer and key generation center (KGC) and the private key to be used for signing is related to identity, so the aggregate signature is widely used in the e-commerce, e-government and electronic money system. On other hand, the aggregate signature is also can be applied well to the secure communication to design the verifiably encrypted signature and ring signature.
Boneh [1] et al. proposed the aggregate signature in 2003. Aggregate signature can provide non-repudiation service for several users and messages. It can compress any number signatures into a signature that reduce the signature of storage space and the computational effort for signing and verifying greatly. Lysyanskaya [2] and Ostrovsky [3] et al. proposed the corresponding sequence aggregate signature schemes respectively. Cheon [4] et al. use the forking lemma developed the first identity-based aggregate signature scheme in 2004. Herranz [5] et al. proposed a definitive identity-based partially signature scheme. Gentry [6] et al. proposed an identity-based signature scheme. Camenisch [7] et al. proposed a batch processing validation short signature scheme. However, these schemes have the key escrow problems and use more bilinear pairings that some extent influences the signature efficiency. In order to improve the signature efficiency, we proposed the CLAS-BP based on the certificateless public key cryptography theory. This scheme satisfies the security requirements of aggregate signature and has more efficiency.
In this paper, firstly we introduced the difficult problems, assumptions and the basic model of certificateless signature. Secondly we proposed a novel CLAS-BP scheme. Our scheme use certificateless public key cryptography theory to solve the key escrow problem and the CLAS-BP scheme satisfies most of the security requirements of aggregate signature. Thirdly, our scheme without uses the bilinear pairings and provides a high efficient.
Paper organization is as follows: section 2 introduces the difficult problems, assumptions and the basic model of certificateless signature. The CLAS-BP is described in section 3. Section 4 gives the security analysis of CLAS-BP. The efficiency analysis is described in section 5.The conclusion is drawn in section 6.
Preliminary Knowledge

Difficult Problems and Assumptions
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: p,q are two prime numbers, and q|(p-1), g is an order for the generation of q element, a,b∈Z p * , and g,g a ,g
* .The probability of success to solve the CDH problem:
The probability calculation is based on a,b in Z p * random selection and the random selection for algorithm A.
Define 2.1 [8] . CDH hypothesis: For any polynomial algorithm A, the probability to solve the CDH problem is negligible.
Discrete logarithm (DL) problem:p,q are the two prime numbers, and q|(p-1), g is an order for the generation of q element and g,g a ∈Z p * to find a∈Z p * . The probability of success to solve the DL problem:
The probability calculation is based on a,b in Z p * random selection and the random selection for algorithm A. Define 2.2 [8] . DL hypothesis: For any polynomial algorithm A, the probability to solve the DL problem is negligible.
The Basic Model of Certificateless Signature
In 2003 certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was proposed by Riyami and Paterson [6] .It doesn't require the use of certificates in traditional public key cryptography and solves the key escrow problem of the identity-based public key cryptography. The signature based on certificateless cryptography includes seven algorithms, these are as follows:
System setup: Enter the security parameter k,KGC output system master key x and system parameters params.
Partial key extract: Enter system parameters, master key x, user A's identity ID A , and output user's partial private key.
Set secret value: Enter system parameters, user A's identity ID A , and the user A randomly selects x A as his secret value.
Private key extract: Enter system parameters, user A's identity ID A , secret value x A and output user A's private key SK A .
Public key extract: Enter system parameters, user A's identity ID A , secret value x A and output user A's public key PK A .
Sign: Enter system parameters, user A's identity ID A , the message M to be signed and the private key SK A , generates a signature σ.
Verify: Input the system parameters params, the message M, the signature σ, the public key PK A of signature user A and user A's identity ID A . If the signature is true, output 1, otherwise output 0.
CLAS-BP Scheme
The Description of CLAS-BP Scheme 
Security Analysis
The Uncomputability of Private Key
The security of private key is based on the KGC and the user and it is not to reveal the private key of system and users. The private key of system r i and the private key of user xi is very important because the private key SK i of signers depends on them. Only the private keys of system and users are all attacked that the entire system will be breached. However, if attackers compute the system and the user private key x i , r i , its difficulty is to solve elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So it is computationally infeasible.
The Non-forgeability of Single Signature
If an attacker u pretended as a signer to forge single signature σ u =(U u ,V u ). The U u can be obtained by the public key but V u cannot be calculated correctly. The reason is that V u =r u +h u +x u and the r u ,x u ,h u is unknown for the attacker u. So the σ i cannot be forged correctly by the attacker. The attacker to obtain the r u ,x u that the difficulty is to solve elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
The Non-forgeability of Aggregate Signature
The same as the non-forgeability of single signature that the attacker can forge U u but cannot forge V u . If an attacker wants to obtain the signatures that need to calculate all the private key of the signers and it is obviously impossible. Even if the attacker gained one or several private key, it is not possible to be validated. Assumed the attacker have obtained the n-1 signatures of signers but just is not getting the signature of u n that it still cannot get the private key SK n of u n .
The Unrelatedness of Private Key
The private key is composed of the system private key and the user private key. The system private key is the hash value of identity and the random number selected by system and it is irrelevant to the other value. The attacker obtains the system and user private keys that are computationally infeasible. The hash value is secret for anyone except the signer and KGC. The user private key is selected by user that is irrelevant to other value. If the attackers want to deduce other users' private key from one user private key that is also computationally infeasible.
Performance Analysis
The efficiency of n signatures aggregation is mainly reflected in the key calculation, the generation and verification of signatures. The paring operation, exponentiation computation and scalar multiplication is major considered when assessment computational cost of the schemes in this paper. Where Pa denotes a paring operation, Exp denotes one exponentiation computation and Sm denotes one group of scalar multiplication. The computational cost comparison results are as in table1. 
2nSm
(2n+1)Pa (2n+1)Pa+2nSm Wen [10] 2nSm (n+1)Pa+nSm (n+1)Pa+3nSm Yu [11] 6nSm 5nPa 5nPa+6nSm CLAS-BP nExp+nSm 2nExp+(n-1)Sm 3nExp+(2n-1)Sm
The scheme of Xu total uses (2n+1)Pa+2nSm, the Wen total uses (n+1)Pa+3nSm and the Yu total uses 5nPa+6nSm. Our schemes total needs 3n exponentiation computations and 2n-1 scalar multiplication. However, the computational complexity of bilinear pairings is seven times than exponentiation computation [8] . So compared with the other schemes, our scheme has the higher efficiency.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel aggregate signature scheme based on the certificateless public key cryptography theory. This scheme solves the identity based aggregate signature schemes in the key escrow problem. The analysis shows that our scheme satisfies the security requirements of aggregate signature. Our scheme requires need 3n exponentiation computations and 2n-1 scalar multiplication. Compared to other aggregate signature schemes, it has more efficiency.
